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The field I have been asked to cover in this presentation is great and my chances
of doing it justice small. I can claim at least to have looked from both sides at the issue:
as a civil servant and as a worker in a self-styled “think and action tank”; as a security
policy maker working with American friends in Europe, and as an analyst looking back
on Europe from New York. However, I am beginning to suspect that the longer I spend
in the United States the less confident I shall be about understanding that remarkable
country. You are perhaps lucky to have caught me at the stage of ignorance when I am
still willing to make some assertions, and at least there will be plenty of chance for the
better qualified speakers in this session, and yourselves, to correct them.
Let me start with some issues of definition.  When we think of public/private
sector interaction in the security policy spheres, we can no longer afford to limit the
issue to the role of the traditional think-tanks. The analytical institute, whether inside
or outside a university, national or international, is only one of many types of NGO
with a stake in this game. Also very important are the campaigning  organizations -
with wide mandates like Amnesty International or a focused one like the anti-land-
mine groups - and the active charities and volunteer organizations who have come so
much to the fore lately in crisis management and reconstruction.  And if we must step
back to take a broader view of the influences on public decision makers, we must
recognize that the strongest players are not often NGOs in the narrower sense but
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parliaments and other representative or civic institutions; lobbyists from the corporate
and social sector; or the controllers and users of written, spoken and electronic media.
I would argue, further, that the circumstances of the post-Cold War world have
tended to improve the odds of all these other non-traditional players influencing policy
outcomes, at the expense of the traditional think-tank. Parliaments –real Parliaments–
are more numerous because of the spread of democracy, and their grip on defence
budgets and security actions is tightening: whether because of a more critical examination
of defence needs in the era of the “peace dividend”; or the crisis of popular confidence
affecting many contemporary governments; or the increasingly legislative nature of the
international agenda which goes with the spread of integrative and globalizing processes.
The corporate sector is becoming not only cleverer at lobbying –and in the case of the
shrinking defence sector perhaps more desperately motivated to do so– but also cleverer
at thinking, due to its own increasing grasp of the need for forward planning and free-
wheeling analysis in a fast-changing global environment. Single-issue lobby groups like
those on landmines which ruthlessly focus their efforts and use hyper-modern advertising
techniques have produced faster and cleaner impacts, at least in the West, than any
traditional arms control analysis. Finally, we are all too familiar with the omniscience
that is claimed and the total access demanded by today’s news media, although as I
shall argue later the policy-shaping qualities of information proffered are not always in
direct relation to its quality. We should certainly not overlook the novel opportunities
both for channeling information and propagating policy messages that are offered (in
the security policy field like any other) by the electronic World Wide Web.
During the Cold War, think-tanks and other independent analysts enjoyed many
comparative advantages. They possessed scarce information and the leisure to process
it, they spoke directly into the ear of governments who could translate thought directly
into action, and their representatives traveled across borders where sometimes diplomats,
let alone businessmen or tourists, could go. In today’s more complex policy game they
have the same basic choices as anyone deprived of a monopoly –to become more
competitive, and/or to learn to influence the other players in the market as well as their
ultimate customers. How well are they in fact surviving in this market, in the special
and especially important case of the United States?
In hopes of giving some spurious scientific quality to my answer I thought I would
offer you this simple model (first slide) for estimating the policy impact of any actor
trying to influence an outcome over which he/she it has no direct control. It defines
impact as the product of three terms: the quality of the input offered; success in defining
the right targets to aim it at, and in hitting them; and the receptiveness of the targets
themselves. To explain a little further: I see quality of input as covering not just the
truth, novelty or intelligence of the ideas offered but also their user-friendliness –which
demands inter alia an understanding of the environment, the limits and the timetables
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within which decision makers operate– and their digestibility, which in a situation of
permanent information overload has something to do with the clarity and leverage of
language used. A further issue is whether the provider chooses to offer ideas alone, or
also makes recommendations on process itself. The choice of targets is now quite a
complex one because it covers not just national governments but international entities,
and also the immediate players –parliaments, the corporate sector, public opinion–
whose knock-on effect on governments might be greater than anything the initial
provider of ideas could achieve directly. Clearly, each of these targets will need to be
addressed by a different set of means and with different styles of language. Finally, the
best-targeted ideas will be for naught if they fall upon stony ground: and thus receptiveness
of the decision-makers is probably the most important of all the factors here –with the
major exception of situations where your policy recommendation is actually to overthrow
the government. If there is to be any interplay at all between public and private, public
officials must want (or at least recognize that they need) a second opinion; must show
some discrimination in what outputs they accept; and must have leeway in their opening
process to incorporate them. This last might not be possible for  number of reasons:
limitations of time and resources, self-imposed legal constitutional restraints, or the
fact that the real decision rests not with them but with some other country, multinational
or supranational entity.
I will offer a few comments on each of these factors in the US context; and I trust
that those who paid my ticket here will understand why I dwell more at certain times
on problems than successes. The US is our leader not just in defence terms, but in the
sense of experiencing certain features of political and economical evolution ahead of
most of its Allies. If we are, in some respects, seeing our own future here it is important
to seek an honest view of whether it works.
I will start from the back end of the model with the question of security actions
and actors. Here is a map of the world (second slide), taken from Penguin Books’
excellent new edition of the ‘State of War and Peace Atlas’. It shows security crises and
potential crises of the 1990’s where independent mediations or dispute resolution has
made a significant difference. Out of the 70 successes identified, no less than 26 are
attributed to the United States. Yet when we look at these detail, it becomes clear that
they are not NGO successes at all. The mediation was certainly independent in the
sense that the US was a non-involved and generally unbiased party, but it was actually
carried out by serving officials, former Presidents, Senators and Congressmen. On
occasions when ex-officials or non-officials took a genuinely independent initiative to
intervene overseas, they were not backed by the Administration and they did not succeed.
The explicit or implicit application of US national leverage was clearly what did the
trick and I see a distinct difference here, at least in degree, from the Cold War years
when back-channel operators from the NGO field or from business played a so much
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greater role. I will leave others to speculate on the reasons, but in passing it is interesting
to note that there is a something of a shortage of independently active, global
organizations centred on US soil –no ICRC, Amnesty or Mèdecins sans Frontières–
nor does the US host any regular international think-fests. Today’s US contribution
is typified by Dayton, not Davos.
It would be wrong to conclude that US-based think-tanks and other NGOs have
played no part in security process. Some, like my own institute, have a very
interventionist attitude to process but carry out their activities largely in Eurasia. Others
have discreetly hosted meetings and other contacts between warring groups and recent
adversaries who may find it easier to talk to one another on US soil. But with all due
respect (and self-respect) one cannot say that these NGOs are central to the US’s external
policy-making. And that is in striking contrast to developments on the US’s domestic
front, where volunteerism has become all the rage in tackling social issues seen for sixty
years previously as among the highest preserves of the government. Last month’s
Philadelphia Summit on youth action, headed as it was by the former Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell, brought out this external/internal dichotomy rather
neatly. Again I will leave it to better-trained analysts to consider whether this is the
post-modern state emerging, or an advanced stage in the life-span of great powers as
predicted earlier by Paul Kennedy.
If we take one step back to the formulation of policy rather than its enactment, the
US security-policy establish looks - at least to this outsider - rather impermeable at many
times and on many issues. US advances in freedom of information would seem to point
the other way. But they are offset by the complexity and unpredictability of the inter-
agency process, the large number of individuals involved and the obscurity of lines of
authority, which combine to make it notoriously difficult even for embassies to get their
message across unless they dive pretty far into the melee themselves. The Presidential
executive has a relatively strong grip on the policy process, including the political
appointment of individuals, down to what other countries would consider relatively
humble levels in the bureaucracy. The bureaucrats themselves have to operate within
bounds set by the powers of Senate and the House of Representants, by the limits on
popular tolerance of which I shall say more later, and also by resources. In the richest
country in the world, appropriations for diplomacy (and to a lesser extent for defence
policy making) have been cut very short for several years now and it can be genuinely
difficult for officials to find either the money or time for meetings with governmental
opposite members, let alone for unofficial conferences and NGOs. The general atmosphere
of work pressure and information overload makes it an act of some self-sacrifice to seek
second opinions at all, and those who do, are often tempted to revisit just a few sources
whom they trust to make inputs in a supportive or at least user-friendly way. A busy
official’s decision on which incoming phone-call to accept is thus at risk of replacing the
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free play of the intellectual market. I hasten to add that the second Clinton Administration
has shown a growing awareness of these issues and that Secretary Albright has a strong
record herself as a proponent of open diplomacy.  For understandable reasons, however,
it looks as if any new resources available will be directed first and foremost to the outward
flow of foreign policy information to the American people.
Again, this does not exclude independent inputs altogether but it has tended to
guide them into certain niches of time and space. NGOs of all kinds can make an
impact in the early stages of discourse and definition on a new policy issue, especially
if they catch the ear of new leaders coming into government. They can guide government
quite directly if they work on direct mandate from it, with access to inside information,
as RAND has done for instance on a number of  enlargement-related studies. The very
system of political appointment means that individuals with NGO background can
move into and out of policy-making jobs quite freely by European standards, although
there is bound to be an issue about how much of their independence remains once
inside the machine. The scope for impact also varies from one policy domain to another;
thus the “hard core” of security-policy issues are tougher for outsiders to penetrate –in
part because they are conducted in a multi-national setting and at such a high tempo–
than the design of policies for individual geographic areas. On the development of new
US strategies towards (for example) Africa and China the terms of the debate among
decision-makers and free analysts seem to be reasonably in synch.  The obvious snag
is that such differences in the mode of policy-making may aggravate risks of incoherence
between the treatment of individuals regions and, in general, between the geographical
and functional components of US diplomacy. Finally, NGOs can find a niche in
partnership with government if they offer demonstrably useful services at the level of
policy process and implementation –like the hosting of informal meetings and informal
dialogues mentioned above or the provision of very specific and short-term advice.
This is clearly easiest for bodies in or near Washington who can home in whenever the
need arrives, and it works only when an NGO ready to come a long way out of the
ivory tower finds officials in a good mood to meet it half-way.
Two brief examples may be taken as a test of this analysis. The idea of NATO
enlargement first gathered steam in the US among non-governmental elites, and
independent thinkers coined many of the catch-words still used today for justifying it.
After the Clinton Administration and NATO as a whole became formally committed
to this policy, there was a much-publicized backlash form US analysts fearing damage
both to relationships with and within Russia, and to NATO itself. At that stage, although
the Administration did adapt its policies to seal off some areas of special vulnerability,
it handled the critics basically as part of the problem to be solved - listening rather to
those  (again, like RAND) who took the enlargement premise as given and offered
remedies for its side-effects. The critics for their part have maintained purity and force
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of argument at the cost of failing to notice a great part of what NATO is actually doing
about enlargement and dodging the issue of what its abandonment would do for Euro-
Atlantic relations at this stage. I may hazard an advance guess that is not they who will
decide the outcome of ratification votes on the Hill. In my second example, the incoming
Clinton Administration set itself apart from the Bush Administration by adopting the
view of former Yugoslavia developed in think-tanks and in particular the moral
supremacy of the moral cause. From 1994 onwards as intra-Alliance tensions proliferated
and US diplomacy got more drawn in on the ground –perhaps especially after the
Contact Group was formed– Washington’s policy became by degrees both more
pragmatic and more inward-turning, culminating in the Dayton Agreement which has
generally been viewed as a return to classic great power diplomacy, not least because
nothing faintly resembling an NGO was present.  (NGOs and multilateral organizations
have of course been drawn into the Dayton implementation process, but relations
between them and the main US players have not been conspicuously smooth).
A short word now about what I defined earlier as intermediate players - the House
of Representatives  and the Senate, media and public opinion. US think-tanks have
not shifted strategy en masse to focus on influencing these influencers, and it is not
difficult to imagine why. With each election Congress has fewer members with
international experience (some 20% of them now carry passports) and the pressures
upon them to represent local interests rather than policy opinion or even Party orthodoxy
are growing all the time. Half at least of their week is spent in their home states and
when they are in Washington it is the sectoral and social lobbies, not the think-tanks,
who are battering down their doors. The best start strategy for merchants of ideas is
generally agreed to be to aim at congressional staffers, but even they are hard to get at
and especially for thinkers working outside Washington. In any case, as we saw with
last month’s vote on the Chemical Weapons Convention, the bargaining which really
shapes decisions on the Hill is done in terms ranging much wider than –and sometimes
far away from– the policy merits of an individual issue.
US public opinion at large has been shown by opinion polls to have a low basic
level of interest in foreign affairs and low threshold for information overload.  It is
sometimes also depicted as inherently or even hostile to the non-American world, and
unwilling to make large or at least sustained efforts on outsiders’ behalf. This is way
too simple because American public sympathy can demonstrably still be stirred by
generous causes, especially if personalized in some way, and US soldiers did after all
go out to Bosnia and stay there. Sustainability is more of a real issue and it must also
be said that America as a nation seems better at giving than receiving, when it comes
to ideas, influence or advice. This is perfectly natural for a super-power: as a character
on “Star Trek” once said, “It’s hard to be a team player when you’re omnipotent”. For
purposes of the present analysis it does, however, obviously limit absorptiveness to
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independent ideas; and the one-way trade syndrome can be diagnosed even in some
US academics who write about Euro-Atlantic institutions with references limited to
US sources, the “Financial Times” and “The Economist”.
The case of the US corporate sector, at least in my limited experience, is interestingly
different.  They do by definition know about imports as well as exports and they have
been highly exposed to –in many cases are leading– the famous processes of economic
“globalization”. Information and ideas about the outside world are part of their currency
and they are still ready to spend considerable resources on what might be called “cross-
over” activities with the sphere of security analysis: either by commissioning and
participating in forward-looking studies, or by making things happen in the actual
security world. George Soros might be cited as representing the philanthropic end of
this spectrum of involvement, and the research and political activities of the defence
sales complex as a rather different dimension of it. Where traditional security think-
tanks fit in is not yet so clear, because not many of them have consciously set out to
meet the present-day needs of US industry and commerce. They must face real obstacles
in the often ultra-rapid and personalized style of corporate decision-making as well as
the self-confidence of private sector leaders who have hundreds of staff in foreign
countries, can see foreign Presidents for their asking and are hard to persuade that they
need a second expert opinion. There are solutions to this challenge but they will demand
forms of partnership quite different from the traditional expert “consultancy” or the
accustomed methods of academic interaction with government.
This brings us full circle to the first part of my equation: the usefulness and user-
friendliness of what independent thinkers can offer. One clear truth is that if they wish
to lead the thinking of governments, parliaments and CEOs, or even just tread helpfully
at their sides, they cannot afford to fall behind them in terms of adaptation to the new
world environment. Decision-makers live in an increasingly complex world of mixed
national and international competence, confusion of the line between foreign and domestic
affairs, new burden-sharing across traditional public/private boundaries, and new
approaches to problem-solving cross functional divides. They exchange information in
new fast ways and they have a whole new set of headaches about information management.
Their element is change, and if NGOs do not themselves handle change well and help
others to handle it, they risk being hit by globalization like the asteroid hit the dinosaurs
–that is, not a quick death but lingering extinction in a cold and dark financial climate.
As to the solutions, let me take you through this diagram (third slide) adapted
from the book ‘The Organization of the Future’ published by the Drucker Foundation
last year. It is a prescription designed for modern organizations generally but it could
fit a policy think-tank as well as any. Having values and an end in view is necessary for
constancy in change, and for relevance in a time when information without pay-off
has become a drug on the market. Wide vision is needed to match the global exposures
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and interactions of real-world actors, and to see even further than they do to the neglected
States and neglected issues of next year’s headlines. Efficient acquisition and sharing
of data, and target-sensitive packaging of information outputs, should go without
saying.  Just as important, and probably as difficult, is the breaking down of functional
divisions within existing institutes and the creation of new partnerships between and
beyond them to boost both their substantive reach and capacity for networking and
influence.  Each NGO must make its own call on whether to go one stage further and
explore the niches open to those who will and can involve themselves in process: and it
would probably not be healthy if every thinking institution were to decide the same
way. However, it is suggestive that so many grants made nowadays by the major
philanthropic foundations have been assigned to NGOs carrying out hands-on mediation
and crisis prevention work. In sum, and in the competitive US environment above all,
some kind of strategy for change must now be seen as the sine qua non for any independent
think-tank’s survival. After all, Mr. Chairman: how can a private institution claim to
offer superior wisdom for the NATO debate if it has not itself embarked on the moral
equivalent of Partnership for Peace, enlargement or opening towards Russia?
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